Country Context
TUNISIA
Tunisia was the catalyst for the “Dignity Revolutions” in 2011 that inspired large mobilizations against authoritarianism, corruption and economic hardship in North African and Middle Eastern countries. The Jasmine Revolution brought President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s 20-year regime down in January 2011 and set the stage for democratic reforms and transitional justice in Tunisia. The interim government seized Ben Ali’s assets, set up human rights and anti-corruption commissions, created a Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice and began a constitution-drafting process. Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution was a result of difficult but hopeful negotiations between the Islamist (Ennahda) and secularist opposition[1] political parties.[i] A month earlier, in December 2013, the Constituent Assembly had passed the Transitional Justice Law,[2] which provided a framework for truth-seeking and accountability and the creation of the Instance Vérité et Dignité (IVD).[ii]
The fact that the IVD had been created by an Islamist government drove resistance from secular-leaning governments that followed, which denied the IVD access to the presidential archives and forced a long delay in formally accepting its final report. The IVD final report was ultimately published in 2019, presenting a comprehensive review of violations from previous regimes based on more than 62,000 complaints.[iii] The most compelling truth-telling of the IVD’s work was during televised public hearings of victims’ testimonies, the first time such stories had been publicly presented to Tunisians. There was, however, no strategy developed by the IVD beyond issuing its report.[iv] Parliament was expected to draft a plan to implement the IVD’s recommendations, but this has yet to happen.
Truth-telling efforts in Tunisia have been strongly resisted by those with links to the old regime, including the business community and media companies that own newspapers and TV channels. Moreover, there still exists a principal fault line in Tunisia between those who see Islam as central to society and governance and those who support the secular ideals that have defined the nation since independence. This divide has mapped directly onto truth-seeking and electoral politics, quickly undoing the broad coalition that helped deliver the revolution and creating a political space for those hoping to rehabilitate the previous regime.
Memory
Communities struggle to access or preserve truth through memory because information about past and current events is closely controlled by the state. As one scholar noted, “The Communist Party of China does not limit itself to controlling China’s society in the present, but also extends its control to the history of the country.”[i] The CCP has traditionally only allowed official commemoration of anniversaries and politically significant dates, shaping a narrative about human rights that valorizes collective social and economic rights at the expense of individual civil and political rights.[ii] Those who propose alternative narratives or question official interpretations are subject to harsh reprisals, including criminal incarceration.[iii]
In the past two years, the Chinese government has promoted narratives about Hong Kong protesters and the experiences of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region that are starkly at odds with information gathered independently. The government uses both the security apparatus and the legal system to silence the press, civil society and China’s few independent political actors. In 2020, China adopted the National Security Law to suppress protests in Hong Kong, whose semi-autonomous status had previously made it the only place in China where public alternative remembrance of historic events was still tolerated. The government has also deployed transnational repression techniques against the Uyghur diaspora that mirror its prior tactics against other religious minorities such as Falun Gong practitioners and Tibetans.
Despite these difficult conditions, there is growing momentum within the Chinese diaspora and international NGO community to undertake and support ongoing documentation efforts. For instance, the Campaign for Uyghurs, founded by democracy activist Rushan Abbas, has gained international prominence for its work and was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 2022.[iv] An investigation led by the Associated Press on forced abortions and sterilization of Uyghur women, which caused a sharp decline in birth rates in Hotan and Kashgar, was also prominently shared by human rights advocates.[v]
Justice
Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, the CCP has tightened control over nearly all elements of Chinese society, frequently using national security and COVID-19 as pretexts. In a recent report, international NGO Chinese Human Rights Defenders said that measures imposed as part of China’s zero-tolerance policy against COVID-19 were “notable for the harshness, speed and systematic thoroughness of their implementation.”[i] These included increased criminal prosecutions for citizen journalists; tighter restrictions on the rights to free association, free expression and peaceful assembly; new rules that further constrain human rights defenders and the lawyers who defend the defenders; and greater impunity for law enforcement officials who violate rights.[ii]
These restrictions do not mean that Chinese citizens are unable to advocate for change, although their options to do so are limited and the chances of achieving accountability for specific violations are slim. For instance, protests against the government’s “zero COVID” policies in November 2022 presented “the most widespread challenge” to CCP control in decades.[iii] Unusually, the government responded by discarding many of the COVID restrictions to “alleviate public anger against the system of digital surveillance used to track and limit the movements of practically all people.”[iv]
Because the government controls information so closely, it is difficult to compile a fully accurate picture of those arbitrarily detained, disappeared, incarcerated in concentration camps or otherwise deprived of their human rights.[v] There are significant gaps in information, including complete and accurate numbers, names, locations and lengths of sentences of detained individuals transferred to reeducation or labor camps and prisons. Government officials also frequently use sham trials in which individuals are convicted of a vague crime—such as traveling to Turkey or praying—based on undisclosed evidence and then sentenced for unspecified or extended periods of time.[vi] In the case of the Uyghurs, the independent people’s Uyghur Tribunal in London sought to close these knowledge gaps by gathering and investigating evidence through a series of in-person and virtual hearings in 2021. In December 2021, the tribunal found that the government of China had committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the Uyghur people.[vii] This finding echoed that of the U.S. State Department and others.[viii] Unfortunately, UNOHCHR’s 2022 report contributed no findings related to genocide allegations, possibly as a result of pressure from the Chinese government.[ix]
Education
China has a free and compulsory nine-year education system for children, using a state-approved curriculum that closely manages what historical information students receive.[i] The curriculum has experienced “several waves of changes” since the PRC was established, usually following major political or social movements within China.[ii] The education system has been effective at improving literacy and numeracy, but access to schooling is still limited for women, people with disabilities, rural people and ethnic minority students in many places across China.[iii] In particular, children of rural-to-urban migrant workers face many challenges[1] accessing high-quality public education.[iv] Instruction in public schools is only in Mandarin, not in the language of any of China’s 55 other recognized ethnic minorities.
The government of China uses education as a tool of both social control and punishment. The PRC has detained over a million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities in reeducation camps in Xinjiang, with ages allegedly ranging from young children to elderly individuals. The government initially denied the existence of these camps. Later, it officially named them “Vocational Educational and Training Centers” and claimed their purpose was to teach cultural values and vocational skills and to prevent citizens from becoming influenced by “extremist and terrorist” ideas.[i] While the PRC asserted in 2020 it was “winding down” its reeducation camps, independent data indicates that the number of camps and rates of incarceration had continued to rise.[ii]
Recommendations
Donors and peer organizations should support CSO transnational documentation initiatives within diaspora communities, particularly the Uyghurs, to draw attention to arbitrary and prolonged detention and a worrying “reeducation to prison pipeline.”
Chinese diaspora and international advocacy organizations should redouble their efforts to engage international justice mechanisms such as the ICC in defense of Uyghurs, political dissidents, journalists and human rights defenders who are arbitrarily detained or convicted in sham trials.
The government of China should reform the official school curriculum to recognize the important historical and ongoing contributions of minority groups to Chinese politics, economics and culture.
CSOs and donors should strive to counter the Chinese government’s historical erasure efforts by supporting international diaspora communities to share alternative perspectives of life in the PRC and to memorialize and preserve cultural heritage through the development of archives and museums in diaspora communities.
Notes
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